QR6.1.6 Information Theories

Physical reality can’t explain consciousness but its information derivative is claimed to do so. Integrated information theory argues that “consciousness is integrated information(Tononi, 2008), generalizing an earlier theory that brain functions like language, vision and hearing deposit information into a global workspace that causes consciousness (Baars, 1988).

Distant brain regions process sight, sound, touch, and smell, then pass the results to areas specializing in memory, emotions, language, planning, and motor responses, but how are global decisions made? Global workspace theory claims that sensory results are put into a common area, for higher functions like memory or language to use. Consciousness then arises when:

“… the information has entered into a specific storage area that makes it available to the rest of the brain.” (Dehaene, 2014) p163.

Yet if a specific brain area is critical for consciousness, why hasn’t it been found? Workspace theory also suggests that neurons “chat” like little people:

“… neural systems do not merely report to their superiors; they also chat among themselves.”(Dehaene, 2014) p176.

Brain science then reduces to neuron sociology (Nunez, 2016) p18, by the analogy of crowd control on the Internet:

“… it is helpful to think metaphorically of a theater of mind. In the conscious spotlight on stage – the global workspace – an actor speaks, and his words and gestures are distributed to many unconscious audience members, sitting in the darkened hall. Different listeners understand the performance in different ways. But as the audience claps or boos in response, the actor can change his words, or walk off to yield to the next performer.(Baars & Laureys, 2004) p672.

Such analogies are seductive, but that neural areas chat like little people over nerve phone lines, or clap and boo each other as we do online, contradicts information theory. To exchange data like this, the brain would need common protocols, just as the Internet needs these protocol layers to share information:

a. Data. Ethernet protocol.

b. Network. Internet protocol (IP).

c.  Transport. Transmission Control Program protocol (TCP).

d. Application. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (http).

The Internet’s TCP/IP/http protocols took decades to develop from the original Arpanet, and it was done by a central group the brain just doesn’t have. Browsers then need to be updated to work with upgrades, like from IP version 4 to 6, but the brain has no way to do this. And these protocols are just to transmit data packages – to actually see a picture or hear music still needs an application specialized for that data type!

For example, Notepad displays text and Paint displays pictures but loading text into Paint or a picture into Notepad gives nonsense, so even if data was put into a common area, neither could read what the other posted. To do this, Paint would need code to analyze text and Notepad would need code to analyze pictures, which increases program size. And if either application changed the other would have to update its included code to work reliably.

Programs like Word that display text and pictures become huge as a result, and they still can’t read zip files, for example. For every brain function to include every other denies the benefits of specialization and updating every area when one changes to share data isn’t feasible for the brain. Information science tells us that one can’t plug the optic nerve into the auditory cortex and expect information to flow like water.

The auditory area of the brain can no more read smell data than I can read a text in Chinese, so what use is a common stage if neural actors don’t use the same language? A global workspace would need a global translator of smells, thoughts, movements, and feelings, which is impossible.

Finally, the Internet shares data so shouldn’t it become conscious? Information integration theorists expect it to do so soon (Koch, 2014), despite no evidence at all for this.

Theories of brain data exchange must respect information science, but global workspace theory doesn’t, and what won’t work for computer networks won’t work for brains either. The cartoonish concept of neural areas as little people chatting via a common brain language that isn’t possible, merging claps or boos they can’t make, on a central stage that doesn’t exist, is a fantasy. The brain needs some other way for different regions to share information.